| Allen L. Springer | International Org. Exam #1- 2000- Answers | ||||||||||||||
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| Grade Scale- Below are the letter equivalents for the numerical scores on the exam. Given the closeness of many of the scores, I have used the grades A/B and B/C for scores that lie between what I considered “solid” As, Bs and Cs. A 62+ A/B 57-61 B 49-56 B/C 44-48 C 30-43 D 25-30 Answers- As you know, each of the questions on the exam was worth a total of 10 points and the whole exam a total of 80 points. In most cases, there was no single “right answer.” Indicated here are some of the points that I considered most appropriate in the best answers I read for each. PART I 1) * Reparations Case- ICJ advisory opinion permitted UN to bring international claim on behalf of damage done both to organization and to an individual UN emissary. Considered important because of UN’s envoys might otherwise feel the need to keep close ties to the state of their nationality to ensure that they would be protected internationally. * Mazilu Case- ICJ advisory opinion that argued in favor of special international protection for a person serving as a Special Rapporteur on a UN committee. The UN could become involved even in a situation where the state Mazilu was officially representing might be taking action against him. * Chinese Translators Case- ILO Administrative Tribunal said that these people should be rehired, because the Tribunal felt that the decision not to rehire was too responsive to the views of the Chinese government. 2) * Pakistan v. India- ICJ decides that ICAO must decide whether the Air Transit Convention is in force. The ICJ felt that Council was able to judge whether Pakistan’s action was a sufficient “material breach” of the Convention to permit India to terminate the agreement (and thus deprive ICAO) of its dispute settlement role. * IMF/IBRD v. All America Cable- FCC decides that it is up to Executive Directors to decide if the “equal treatment” requirement in the Articles of Agreement includes cable rates equal to those charged the US government. Treats the ED’s decision as “binding” as well as “final.” 3) * Helms- The UN is trying to become a supranational entity, and in the process is developing a huge and intrusive bureaucracy and its operating costs are spiralling. The US must insist on major programmatic and budget cuts and more voluntary funding of those programs we do approve of or the US should be prepared to leave the Organization. The prospects for effective reform are not great. * Hirsch- The UN is “demoralized and in disarray” largely as a result of failed Clinton Administration policies and a tendency to blame UN for problems US for which the US is at least partly responsible. (eg Somalian intervention). Reforms are needed, but the UN also needs to be sure of the US commitment and funding. If UN and US work together, successes, like that in East Timor, can be achieved. * Schlesinger- Contributing to the UN problem are misconceptions about the nature of UN, what it was from beginning, how it has changed, etc.. The UN has never been simply an altruistic endeavor and the US has always seen itself as a key nation for UN success. The reforms can work as long as members, including the U.S., set realistic expectations. 4) There were a number of possible answers here. Below are what I consider the strongest points. * The League was unable to respond effectively in Manchuria and Ethiopia in part because of a lack of collective military sanctions. The Charter called for the Security Council to be able to impose a range of sanctions, including military ones and provided (in theory) for the negotiation of agreements through which military forces would be made available to the SC on a standby basis. * The League required unanimity in the Council before effective action could be taken, a very high degree of consensus. The Security Council required that only 9 of the 15 members be in agreement. Thus the tendency to take steps around which more states could rally, as in the sending of investigative commission to Manchuria. * The League process required states not to go to “war” in violation of League procedural obligations. The label war could be and was avoided, for instance in the Japanese attack on Manchuria, thus creating doubts as to whether the sanction system of the League applied. The UN Charter made reference to “threats or uses of force” rather than war * The League lacked membership provisions that would promote the universality needed to make sanctions effective. Some key states (the US) did not join and others (Japan, Italy, Germany) quit. The UN Charter did not come into effect until the 5 major powers ratified the Charter and there was no provision to permit states to withdraw from the UN. 5) * The General Assembly, which gives major powers only 1 nominal vote, has moved toward the use of consensus voting procedures in the 5th Committee, which controls the budget, and in conferences like that on the law of the sea. This provides an effective veto to all members (including the major ones). * The Security Council provides the veto and permanent member status to the 5 major powers. * The International Monetary Fund provides weighted voting, whereby those states making the greatest contribution to the organization receive the most votes. PART II A) Durblatz is a UN member with a history of violating its trade agreements with other states. In Resolution 1928, the UN Security Council unanimously “Deplores Durblatz’s failure to respect its international obligations” and “Urges member states to impose a complete trade embargo on Durblatz.” However, members of the U.S. Congress pass the Trade with Durblatz Act (TDA) requiring all U.S. companies to “continue normal trading relations with Durblatz.” When Acme Amalgamated (a U.S appliance company) continues selling toasters to Durblatz, a pro-UN organization in New York brings a suit in U.S. courts demanding that Acme Amalgamated stop the sales which, they claim, are a ”violation of U.S. obligations under the UN Charter.” As a representative of Acme Amalgamated, explain fully why this suit should fail. * Res. 1928 has no legal effect, since it is not even a “binding decision” under Article 25. This is clear from the language of the resolution. Even if the Council had intended otherwise, it could not have handed down such a decision here, because there is no evidence of a “threat to international peace and security” in Durblatz’s failure to respect its trade obligations. * Even if Res. 1928 is binding, it has been overridden by a subsequent act of the US Congress, which clearly intended to continue trade relations with Durblatz. * As in Diggs v. Shultz, the issue is non-justiciable since it calls upon the court to play an inappropriate role in deciding between the constitutional responsibilities of the Congress and the Executive. B) * The UN has no business becoming involved in the question of Berabia nationality standards. This is an internal matter, where there is no threat to international peace and security, so the Assembly’s action is a violation of Art. 2(7) of the Charter. This argument is similar to many advanced by South Africa in the past. * The General Assembly resolution which purports to bestow “UN nationality” on the Bandi is, at best, a non binding recommendation. At worst, it is an illegal interference in Berabia internal affairs. * The Secretary-General has no right to bring a serious case against Berabia to the ICJ. Only states can be party to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. Any request for an advisory opinion must come from either the General Assembly or the Security Council and any advisory opinion is just that, advisory, with no legal effect on Berabia. C) * The Chinese are saying that the U.S. has a duty to abstain in the vote because it is a “party to the dispute” under discussion by the Council. * The U.S. can argue that it is not a party to the dispute, since the dispute is between Calypso and Tropicana. The use of US planes, and even US intelligence, is not a sufficient link to make the US a party. * Even if the U.S. were considered a “party,” the UN action being voted upon is an “enforcement action” being taken under Ch. VII, not Ch. VI, and therefore the U.S. has no duty to abstain. * Even if the UN action is somehow treated as taking place under Ch. VI, the “precedent” established earlier during the French/Comoros Islands debate suggests that the United States need not abstain. D) * US authorities violated the terms of the Headquarters Agreement by entering the Headquarters Area without the consent of the Secretary-General. * Svenson, even as a middle-level UN employee, deserves immunity from US criminal jurisdiction when acting in his official capacity, as he clearly was when he was hanging the flags. The U.S. had no right to seize and try him. * RAFA, the U.S. law under which Svenson was prosecuted, is inconsistent with the rules of the UN. Under the Headquarters Agreement, the US agreed not to enforce US rules in the Headquarters Area which were inconsistent with UN rules, at least until some effort could be made to reconcile them. E) * Any state may vote against the admission of a proposed new member, as long it bases its vote on the failure of the entity to meet the standards of Art. 4 of the UN Charter. This is clear from the Conditions for Membership case. * The U.S. feels Puerto Rico is not an independent state, in part because the PRIF does not have effective control over the entire island. At minimum, a state of civil war exists. * Even if Puerto Rico were considered a state, its current government is clearly not peaceloving, given its brutal treatment of innocent civilian and therefore should not be admitted. * Puerto Rico must also prove that it is willing and able to fulfill its obligations under the Charter, both of which can be challenged given what we know about PRIF. |
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Allen L. Springer- aspringe@polar.bowdoin.edu Department of Government and Legal Studies Bowdoin College Brunswick, ME 04011-8498 Tel: 207-729-8502 Fax:- 207-725-3168 |
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